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Chinese exports have become increasingly sophisticated. This has generated anxiety in developed
countries as competitive pressure may increasingly be felt outside labor-intensive industries. Using
product-level data on exports from different cities within China, this paper investigates the contributing
factors to China's rising export sophistication. Somewhat surprisingly, neither processing trade nor
foreign invested firms are found to play an important role in generating the increased overlap between
China’s export structure and that of high-income countries. Instead, improvement in human capital
and government policies in the form of tax-favored high-tech zones appear to be the key to the country's
evolving export structure. On the other hand, processing trade, foreign invested firms, and government-sponsored
high-tech zones all have contributed significantly to raising the unit values of Chinese exports within
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“Everyone knew that we would lose jobs in labor-intensive industries like textiles and apparel, 
but we thought we could hold our own in the capital-intensive, high-tech arena. The numbers 
we’re seeing now put the lie to that hope—as China expands its share even in core industries 
such as autos and aerospace.” 
Robert Scott, US Economic Policy Institute, 
Author of a report presented to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 




China’s rise as a trading power has taken the world by storm. Its exports have risen from 18 
billion dollars or less than 4% of its GDP in 1980 to more than 760 billion dollars or about 35% 
of its GDP by 2005. Besides the rapid expansion of its trade volume, researchers have noted 
another feature: China’s level of sophistication has been rising steadily. This sophistication can 
be seen in three aspects, two noted in the literature, and the third presented here, by us. First, as 
Schott (2006) noted, China’s export structure increasingly resembles the collective export 
structure of the high-income countries in a way that seems unusual given China’s endowment 
and level of development. Second, as Rodrik (2006) observed, the level of GDP per capita 
associated with countries exporting the same basket of goods as China is much higher than 
China’s actual level of income per capita. Third, as we will show, the fraction of product lines 
that the United States, the 15-member European Union and Japan (referred to thereafter as G-3) 
export, that China does not, is shrinking steadily. Obviously, these three trends are not 
independent from each other. Taken at their face value, they may suggest that China is 
competing head to head with producers from developed and developing nations alike. This has 
generated a tremendous amount of anxiety in many nations. Why would China, a country with 
extreme abundance in labor, but relative scarcity in capital, skilled labor, and R&D investment, 
produce and export a bundle of goods which resembles those of developed countries? Schott’s 
(2006) conjecture is that China’s export bundle results from a combination of large regional 
variations in factor endowment and large impediments to factor mobility across regions. 
 
The evolution of China’s export sophistication during 1996-2005 is traced out in Table 1. This 
table shows that the level of dissimilarity between China’s export structure and that of the G3 
economies declined from 133.7 in 1996 to 121.5 by 2005.
1 During the same period, the number 
of HS 6-digit product lines exported by G3 countries but not by China fell from 101 in 1996 to 
83 in 2005, out of 4143 and 4212 in total, respectively. As a share of the product lines that the 
G3 export, those not manufactured by China fell from 2.44% of the total in 1996 to 1.97% in 
2005. This count is slightly misleading as China exports a very small volume (i.e. less than $1 
million) in several product lines. Excluding these lines, the share of products exported by the G3 
but not by China fell from 28.7% (1189/4143) in 1996 to 13.7% (578/4212) in 2005
2. 
 
How much should developed countries be concerned with rising competitive pressure from 
increasingly sophisticated Chinese exports? The answer depends on the sources of China’s rising 
                                                 
1  This is computed at national level using equation (2) (excluding the region subscript). 
2 There is virtually no product that China exports but G-3 does not.   3
sophistication. On the one hand, this sophistication, as measured, could be a statistical mirage 
due to processing trade. For example, both the United States and China may export notebook 
computers, but Chinese manufacturers may have to import the computer’s most sophisticated 
components, such as processors (CPUs) made by Intel or ADM in the United States. In such a 
case, Chinese producers may specialize in the unsophisticated stage of production, although the 
final product is classified as sophisticated. If one were able to classify a product further into its 
components, China and developed countries might be found to produce different components. 
That is, they do not compete directly with each other. In this scenario, there is very little for the 
developed countries to worry about. 
 
As a variation of this scenario, China and the high-income economies may export the same set of 
product lines, but they may export very different varieties within each product line, with China 
exporting varieties of much lower quality.
3 Competition between the high-income economies and 
China need not be tense. 
 
On the other hand, the Chinese authorities, including governments at the regional/local levels, 
have been actively promoting quality upgrades to China’s product structure through tax and 
other policy incentives. A particular manifestation of these incentives is the proliferation of 
economic and technological development zones, high-tech industrial zones, and export 
processing zones around the country. Their collective share in China’s exports rose from less 
than 6% in 1995 to about 25% by 2005. These policy incentives could increase the similarity of 
Chinese exports to those of developed countries, though they are unlikely to be efficient (unless 
learning by doing confers a significant positive externality). If policy is the primary driver for 
rising sophistication (rather than the mis-measurement induced by processing trade) then China 
may come into more direct competition with developed countries. 
 
Foreign-invested firms in China straddle these two explanations. The share of China’s total 
exports produced by wholly foreign-owned firms and Sino-foreign joint ventures has risen 
steadily over time, from about 31% in 1995 to more than 58% by 2005 (Table 2). These foreign-
invested firms may choose to produce and export much more sophisticated products than would 
indigenous Chinese firms. In this scenario, while China-made products may compete with those 
from developed countries, the profits from such activities contribute directly to the GNPs of 
developed countries. Besides the direct effect of foreign invested firms on China’s export 
upgrading, the presence of foreign firms may help indirectly to raise the sophistication of 
Chinese exports through various spillovers to domestic firms (Hale and Long 2006). The above 
three possible explanations can reinforce each other, rather than being mutually exclusive. For 
example, a foreign-invested firm may engage in processing trade while located in a high-tech 
zone. 
                                                 
3 Xu (2007) noted that for the same product, the unit value of China’s exports tends to be lower 
than that of rich countries, indicating that China’s varieties are of lower quality and presumably 
of lesser sophistication. Fontagne, Gaulier and Zignago (2007, Tables 1 and 2) show that China’s 
export structure, defined the same way as in Schott (2006) but at the HS 6-digit level, is more 
similar to Japan, the United States, and the European Union than to those of Brazil and Russia. 
However, judged on unit values, Chinese exports are more likely to be in the low end of the 
market than are those of the high-income countries.    4
 
To the best of our knowledge, direct evidence on the importance of these channels is not yet 
available in the literature. By using a very detailed product-level data set on Chinese exports, 
disaggregated by firm ownership types and across about 240 Chinese cities, this paper aims to 
provide some answers. 
 
To preview some of our key findings, we will argue that it is important to look both at export 
structure and at the unit value of exports. We will report evidence that neither processing trade 
nor foreign invested firms play an important role in generating the increased overlap between 
China’s export structure and that of the high-income countries. Instead, improvement in human 
capital and government policies in the form of tax-favored high-tech zones appear to contribute 
significantly to the rising sophistication of China’s exports.  
 
An analysis of unit values adds important insights. Processing trade is positively associated with 
higher unit values. In the absence of data on value added from imported inputs versus domestic 
inputs, it is difficult to say whether processing trade has generated any skill upgrading for China. 
However, after controlling for processing trade, exports by foreign-invested firms tend to have  
systematically higher unit values, suggesting that they produce higher-end product varieties 
(beyond promoting processing exports). High-tech zones and other policy zones set up by the 
government are likewise associated with higher unit values (beyond promoting processing trade). 
Therefore, both foreign investment and government policy zones are conducive to greater 
product sophistication, by increasing the overlap in China’s export structure with that of the 
advanced economies and/or by producing higher-end varieties within a given product category.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the basic specification and the 
underlying data, Section 3 reports a series of statistical analyses, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Specification and Data 
 
Our strategy is to make use of variations across Chinese cities in both export sophistication and 
its potential determinants to study their relationship. We look at two measures of export 
sophistication: (a) the similarity between local export structure to that of the G3 economies, and 
(b) the unit value of local exports. We consider several categories of determinants, including the 
level of human capital, the use of processing trade, and the promotion of sophistication by 
governments through high-tech and economic development zones. 
 
2.1 Data and Basic Facts 
 
Data on China’s exports were obtained from the China Customs General Administration at the 
HS 8-digit level (the most disaggregated level of classification available). The administration’s 
database reports the geographic origin of exports (from more than 400 cities in China), policy 
zone designation (i.e., whether an exporter is located in any type of policy zone), firm ownership, 
and transaction type (whether an export is related to processing trade, as determined by customs 
declarations) for the period from 1995 through 2005. 
   5
We link this database with a separate database on Chinese cities, including gross metropolitan 
product (GMP) per capita, population, college enrolment, and FDI data, downloaded from China 
Data Online (a site managed by the University of Michigan China Data Center). Unfortunately, 
the coverage of this second database is more limited (240 cities from 1996 through 2004), which 
effectively constrains the ultimate sample for the statistical analyses. Our sample of cities is 
listed in Appendix Table 3.  
 
The exports by the G3 economies at HS 6-digit level come from the United Nations’ 
COMTRADE database, downloaded from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). We 
wish to focus on manufactured goods, not on natural resources, and have therefore excluded the 
goods in HS Chapters 1-27 (agricultural and mineral products) and raw materials and their 
simple transformations (mostly at HS 4-digit level) in other HS chapters. A list of excluded 
products is reported in Appendix Table 4.    
 
Summary statistics are reported in Tables 2-4. Table 2 reports a breakdown of export value by 
the ownership of exporters. A number of features are worth noting. First, the share of China’s 
exports produced by state-owned firms declined steadily from 66.7% in 1995 to 39.8% in 2005. 
This reduction in the role of state-owned firms in exports mirrors the reduced economic role of 
the state in general. Second, foreign-invested firms (both wholly foreign-owned firms and Sino-
foreign joint ventures) play a significant role in China’s exports. Their share of China’s exports 
also grew steadily from 31.5% in 1995 to 58.3% in 2005. The role played by foreign firms in 
China’s export industries is greater than their role in most other countries with a population over 
10 million. Third, exports by truly private domestic firms are relatively small, though their share 
in China’s exports has similarly increased over time, from basically nothing before 1997 to 
17.8% by 2005. Some growth in exports by domestic private firms is achieved by a change in 
firm ownership. For example, the laptop manufacturer Lenovo was established as a partly state-
owned firm. By 2003, it was a privately owned firm. By now, Lenovo has attracted foreign 
investment, acquired the original IBM PC division, and exported products under the IBM brand.  
 
Table 3a reports a breakdown of China’s exports into processing trade, normal trade, and other 
categories according to exporters’ customs declarations. Processing exports come from three 
areas: (a) export processing zones, (b) various high-tech zones, and (c) areas outside any policy 
zones. Collectively, their share of the country’s total exports increased from 43% 
(=0+3.2%+39.8%) in 1995 to 52% (=4.6%+11.8%+35.6%) in 2005. As we lack information on 
the share of processing exports for other countries, we cannot conduct a formal international 
comparison. Our conjecture is that few developing countries would have a share of processing 
exports as large as China’s. On the other hand, we conjecture that China’s reported processing 




Table 3b tabulates the distribution of firm ownership for exports from each type of policy zone. 
Foreign-invested firms are dominant in processing exports, accounting for 100% of exports out 
                                                 
4 Fisman and Wei (2004) provide evidence of massive tariff evasion on China’s imports. Fisman, 
Moustakerski, and Wei (2008) suggest that entrepot trade via Hong Kong may have been used as 
a conduit for part of the tariff evasion.   6
of export processing zones, 95% of processing exports out of high-tech zones, and 67% of 
processing exports from the rest of China. State-owned firms account for the bulk of the 
remaining processing trade. Therefore, wholly and partly foreign-owned firms handle most 
processing exports. The reverse is not true—foreign firms also engage in normal (i.e. “non-
processing”) exports, accounting in 2004 for 40% of non-processing exports out of high-tech 
zones, and for 24% of normal trade outside policy zones. 
 
We can compute a breakdown of export type (processing or non-processing) by ownership. The 
result is reported in Table 4b. For both wholly foreign-owned firms and Sino-foreign joint 
ventures, processing trade accounts for nearly 50% of exports. For state-owned firms and 
collectively owned firms, the share of processing exports in their total exports is 18% and 13%, 
respectively. Domestic private firms engage in comparatively little processing trade, making less 
than 7% of their exports in this category.  
 
As part of its development strategy, China established a number of special economic zones and 
other areas where special incentives were applied following 1979. Five special economic zones 
(SEZs) were set up and should be distinguished from other special economic areas. These 
include all of Hainan province, three cities in Guangdong province (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and 
Shantou), and a city in Fujian Province (Xiamen). Other special economic areas are much 
smaller geographically and are classified as Economic and Technological Development Areas 
(ETDAs), Hi-Technology Industry Development Areas (HTIDA), and Export Processing Zones 
(EPZs). Some of these special incentive zones and areas are located within the five SEZs. We 
will also refer to these incentive zones or areas as “policy zones”.    
 
ETDAs and HTIDAs are tax-favored enclaves established by central or local governments (with 
approval by the central government) to promote development of sectors designated as “high and 
new tech,” albeit by somewhat poorly defined criteria. In theory, there are differences between 
the two types of zones. In practice, however, the line between the two is often blurred. The 
determination of what firms should go into a particular type of zone is somewhat arbitrary; 
therefore, we group them together in our subsequent discussions. With progressively more 
ETDAs and HTIDAs being established, their share in China’s exports has grown steadily in our 
sample, from only 4.3% in 1995 to 15.4% in 2005 (sum of Columns 4 and 5 in Table 3a). Since 
most cities do not yet have such zones, an unweighted average of their share in a city’s exports, 
across all cities and years, comes to only 2% (sum of Column 4 and 5 in top panel of Table 4b).  
 
Dedicated export processing zones (which exclusively export processing trade) were first 
established in 2001, and are present in only 26 cities today. By 2005, only 3.5% of exports came 
from all the export processing zones together (Table 3a). On simple average (across cities and 
years), only 0.04% of exports come from EPZs. This means that most of China’s processing 
exports are produced outside export processing zones. It is useful to bear this in mind when 
interpreting the regression coefficients in the subsequent tables. 
 
Foreign-invested firms dominate processing exports from EPZs and high-tech zones (in our 
sample period, 99 % and 95% respectively—see Table 3b), and also took a lion’s share of 
processing trade (67%) outside those policy zones. State-owned firms are the major players in 
normal exports, accounting for 58% of normal exports from high-tech zones and 63% of normal   7
exports outside policy zones, during our sample period. Though they played a small role in 
processing trade, collectively owned and private firms produced an important share of China’s 
normal exports, accounting for 8.5% of normal exports from high-tech zones and 18% of exports 
outside policy zones (Table 3b).     
 
2.2 Basic Specification 
 
We relate the sophistication level of local export structure to its plausible determinants, including 
the role of processing trade, foreign investment, and local human capital. Formally, the 
econometric specification is given by the following equation (or by variations to be noted):  
 
Ln( rft EDI )=city_fixed+year_fixed+ 1 β EPZ_sharerft
+ 2 β High_tech_zone_processing_Sharerft
+ 3 β Processing_outside_anyzone_sharerft
+β4High_tech_zone_nonprocessing_sharerft 
+ 5 β Ln( rt GMP )+ 6 β SKILLrt +other_controls+ rft μ
      ( 1 )  
 
Where Ln(EDI) is the log of a dissimilarity index between a Chinese city’s export structure and 
the combined export structure of the United States, Japan, and the European Union.  β1 β2,…, β6 
are coefficients to be estimated. μrft is the error term.  Other regressors and the sources of our 
data are explained in Appendix Table 1. Robust standard errors, clustered by city, are reported. 
 
We define an index for a lack of sophistication by the dissimilarity between the product structure 
of a region’s exports and that of the G3 economies, or the export dissimilarity index (EDI), as: 
 
EDIrft =100( abs(sirft −
i
∑ si,t
ref ))         (2) 
 
w h e r e                 ( 3 )  
 
             
Where sirft is the share of HS product i at 6 digit level in Chinese city r’s exports for firm type f 
in year t, and si,t
ref
 is the share of HS product i in the 6-digit level exports of G3 developed 
countries. The greater the value of the index, the more dissimilar the compared export structures 
are. If the two export structures were identical, then the value of the index would be zero; if the 
two export structures were to have no overlap, then the index would take the value of 200. We 
regard an export structure as more sophisticated if the index takes a smaller value. Alternatively, 
one could use the similarity index proposed by Finger and Kreinin (1979) and used by Schott 
(2006) (except for the scale): 
 
ESIrft = 100 min
i
∑ (sirft , si,t
ref)          ( 4 )  
 
This index is bounded by zero and 100. If Chinese city r’s export structure had no overlap with 






perfect overlap, then the index would take the value of 100.  It can be verified that there is a one-





          ( 5 )  
 
Appendix Table 7 reports regressions that use ESI and EDI in levels, respectively, as the 
dependent variables. It can be seen that the coefficient on any given regressor always has the 
opposite sign in each of the two specifications. These linear specificatione have the drawback 
that the error term is far from being normally distributed. A better specification would use logged 
EDI or logged ESI as the dependent variable. However, log(ESI) is related to log(EDI) only non-
linearly. Economic theory does not give much guidance to the exact functional form. Our 
experimentation suggests that using log(EDI) as the dependent variable is more likely to produce 
robustly significant coefficients. Most importantly, the sign patterns on the coefficient estimates 
are consistent between regressions using logged EDI and EDI, respectively, as the dependent 
variables; but they are inconsistent between regressions using logged ESI and ESI as the left-




3.1 Basic Results 
 
Our regression results are reported in Table 5. In the first four columns, the sophistication of a 
city’s export structure is measured on a year-by-year basis by its similarity with that of the G3 
high-income countries. As a robustness check, in the last four columns, export sophistication is 
measured against the export structure of the high-income countries in a fixed year (2004, the last 
in our sample period). The change in reference year for export sophistication does not turn out to 
matter qualitatively. 
 
The coefficient on “export processing zone exports as a share of total city exports” is negative 
and significant, implying that exports from EPZs tend to be more similar to those of the G3 high-
income countries than are typical Chinese exports. However, as a majority of Chinese cities do 
not have EPZs, this does not contribute much to explaining cross-city differences in export 
sophistication. 
 
The coefficients on the two variables describing exports from high-tech zones (“processing 
exports from high-tech zones” and “non-processing exports from high-tech zones”) are negative 
and significant, implying that the high-tech zones do contribute to raising the sophistication of 
the Chinese export structure. Comparing the two point estimates, however, one sees that the non-
processing exports from the two types of high-tech zones in fact contribute more to raising 
export sophistication than do processing exports.  
 
The coefficient of processing exports outside any policy zones is positive and significant: the 
more processing trade outside any policy zones, the less sophisticated a city’s exports are. 
Taking the discussion of the last four coefficients together, we argue that processing trade 
(outside policy zones) is unlikely to have promoted the resemblance of the Chinese export   9
structure to that of the high-income countries. This argument is consistent with the intuition that 
processing trade in many areas of China, excepting policy zones, is relatively labor-intensive. 
 
The coefficient on student enrollment in colleges or graduate schools as a share of a given city’s 
non-agricultural population— a proxy for that city’s level of human capital— is negative and 
significant, consistent with the notion that a city with more skilled labor tends to have a more 
sophisticated export structure. In column 2 of Table 5, we use a gross metropolitan product 
(GMP) per capita as an alternative measure of a city’s level of human capital. This variable also 
produces a negative coefficient, indicating an association between more human capital and more 
sophisticated export structure. 
  
In columns 3-4 of Table 5, we include measures of the presence of foreign firms in a city. The 
estimated coefficient for exports by wholly foreign-owned firms as a share of a city’s total 
exports is not significantly different from zero. Interestingly, the share of exports by joint-
venture firms has a positive coefficient: the more a city’s exports come from joint-venture firms, 
the less that city’s export structure resembles that of the high-income countries. These results 
suggest that foreign-invested firms in China are not directly responsible for the rising 
sophistication of China’s export structure, or at least not in a simple linear fashion. 
  
As we explained earlier, columns 5-8 of Table 5 replicate the first four columns except that the 
left-hand-side variables are re-calibrated against the export structure of the G3 economies in 
2004. The qualitative results remain essentially the same. To summarize the key findings that 
emerge from the series of regressions in Table 5, we find that: 
 
(a) Cross-city differences in human capital are linked to cross-city differences in the level of 
sophistication of export structures. A higher level of human capital, measured either by GMP per 
capita, or by college and graduate school enrollment, is associated with a more sophisticated 
export structure. 
 
(b) High-tech zones are associated with more sophisticated export structures. The higher the 
share of a city’s exports produced in high-tech zones, the more likely that city’s export structure 
is to resemble that of the G3 high-income economies. 
 
(c) The export processing zones (EPZs) contribute to rising sophistication in export structures. 
However, since only a small fraction of Chinese cities have EPZs, these play a very small 
quantitative role in explaining cross-city differences in export structure sophistication. 
 
(d) Processing trade is not generally a major factor in explaining cross-city differences in export 
structure sophistication. This can be seen in two ways. First, with regards to exports outside 
policy zones (which represent the lion’s share of all exports), more processing trade is in fact 
associated with less resemblance to the export structure of the high-income countries. Second, 
with regards to exports produced in high-tech zones, non-processing trade is more responsible 
for a resemblance to the export structure of the high-income countries than processing trade.  
 
(e) After controlling for exports from major policy zones, foreign investment appears not to play 
a major role in explaining cross-city differences in the level of sophistication of their export   10
structures. If anything, joint-venture firms may create some divergence between a city’s export 
structure and that of the high-income economies.  
 
These findings reject the view that China’s increasingly sophisticated export structure is the 
product of processing trade and/or foreign invested firms. Meanwhile, these findings confirm the 
importance of human capital and government-sponsored high-tech zones in increasing the 
sophistication of China’s export structure. 
 
The specification used in Table 5 includes city fixed effects, as is expected in panel regressions 
such as ours. However, to ensure that the variables we have proposed—processing trade, foreign 
ownership, high-tech zones, human capital, etc.—collectively have sufficient explanatory power 
over observed cross-city export structure dissimilarities, we have run similar regressions without 
city fixed effects (see Appendix Table 8). The signs on the coefficient estimates and their 
statistical significance are generally similar in Appendix Table 8 and in Table 5. Equally 
important, the values of R-square in this second set of regressions lie in the range of 66-68%. 
This suggests that much of the cross-city differences in export patterns are explained by the 
included regressors, and not by city fixed effects. 
 
3.2 Exports by Firms of Different Ownership 
  
Because China is still transitioning from a centrally planned system to a market based economy, 
and has become very open to foreign direct investment (as the greatest developing-country 
recipient of FDI since 1995), its exports are primarily generated by state-owned firms and 
foreign-invested firms rather than by domestic privately owned firms. State-owned and foreign-
invested firms account for 40% and 51% of China’s total exports during our sample period, 
respectively (Table 2). It will be beneficial to examine the determinants of export structure 
sophistication by firm ownership type.  
 
Table 6 reports a series of regressions of the export structure dissimilarity index for state-owned 
firms (that are otherwise identically specified as those in Table 5). The results shown in Table 6 
are qualitatively very similar to those in Table 5. In particular, differences in the degree of 
processing trade (outside policy zones) are not shown to be responsible for cross-city differences 
in export structure sophistication. If anything, processing trade outside policy zones may have 
reduced the resemblance of Chinese export structures to those of high-income countries. More 
human capital, as measured by either GMP per capita or college student enrollment, is associated 
with an increased resemblance of state-owned enterprise (SOE) export structures to that of the 
high-income countries. 
 
Columns 3-4 and 7-8 of Table 6 can be interpreted as a test of possible spillover from foreign-
invested firms to local SOEs in any given city.
5 The coefficients on the shares of wholly foreign-
owned firms or joint ventures in a city’s total exports are essentially zero, statistically. Therefore, 
                                                 
5 Hale and Long (2006) suggest that foreign firms in China generate technological spillover to 
local firms in part through the re-employment of skilled labor from foreign-invested firms by 
local firms.    11
the presence by foreign firms in the same industry and in the same city does not appear to affect 
whether SOE exports resemble those of the high-income countries. 
 
Tables 7 and 8 report similar regressions for wholly foreign-owned and Sino-foreign joint-
venture firms, respectively. In these tables, unlike in Tables 5 and 6, no regressor except the 
proxies for human capital is statistically significant. This reinforces our earlier conclusion that, 
during our sample period, foreign-invested firms did not contribute to the rising sophistication of 
China’s export structure. Tables 7 and 8 suggest that this is true whether foreign firms are 
located in EPZs, high-tech zones, or elsewhere. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from 
examining whether FDI from different source countries has differentially promoted the 
sophistication of China’s export structure.
6    
 
For completeness, we also examine the dissimilarity index of export structures relative to the G3 
economies for collectively and privately owned firms, respectively (see Tables 9 and 10). For 
each type of firm, a higher level of local human capital is associated with the greater 
resemblance of its exports to those of the high-income countries. For collectively owned firms 
alone, there is evidence that processing trade both within and without policy zones may have 
slowed the rise in the sophistication of these firms’ export structures. This is consistent with the 
possibility that most of these collectively owned firms operate in labor-intensive industries. 
 
For domestic private firms (but not for collectively owned firms) EPZs promote a similar export 
structure to that of the rich countries. However, EPZs do not exist in most cities. In contrast to 
the SOEs, wholly foreign-owned firms or joint ventures in the same city have some impact on 
private firms’ export structure sophistication;,both coefficients are negative (the coefficient for 
wholly foreign-owned firms is statistically significant). This is evidence that the presence of 
foreign invested firms may have helped Chinese private firms increase their export sophistication 
over the sample period.    
 
3.3 Unit Value 
 
Recent literature emphasizes the importance of specialization across varieties within a product 
(Schott 2004); we now look at cross-city differences in the unit value of the same product, where 
a product is defined both by its HS 8-digit code and by its physical unit code. For example, HS 
“94053000” refers to “lighting sets used for Christmas trees”, but there are two different physical 
units used to measure the quantities of exports of this product: number of items and mass in 
kilograms. We take (94053000, number of items) and (94503000, kilograms) as two different 
products in our estimation. 
 
Our assumption is that different unit values for the same product reflect different varieties (and 
statistical noise). For example, both high-end and low-end digital cameras fit into the same HS 8-
digit product classification, but high-end cameras command a higher unit value. We note, 
                                                 
6 Xu and Lu (2007) report differences between firms from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and 
those from the United States and other OECD countries. 
   12
however, that differences in unit value within an 8-digit product category may also reflect factors 
other than quality, such as differences in production costs (see Hallack 2006; and Hallack and 
Schott 2006). We will assume that these factors generate noise in the mapping of unit value 
against product variety.  
 
We now investigate the roles of processing trade, high-tech zones, and firm ownership in 
explaining differences in unit value (which proxy for differences in variety) within a product 
category. To fix intuition, let us look at two examples. As a first example, color video monitors 
(HS code 852821) were produced and exported in 2005 by local and foreign-invested firms 
located in export processing zones and high-tech zones, and also outside policy zones. The 
average unit value of monitors produced by foreign-invested firms was $241.50. Even monitors 
produced entirely by foreign-invested firms in China showed variations in unit value dependent 
on where the producer was located and whether the export was of processing trade or normal 
trade. The unit value of monitors exported from an export processing zone was $347.80; 
processing-export monitors from a high-tech zone were valued at $456.70, while normal-export 
monitors from the same zone were sold for $364.80; in distinction, processing-export monitors 
from outside any policy zone were valued at only $56.80, and normal-trade monitors from 
outside any policy zone cost $73.60. Ownership also matters. The unit value of a monitor was 
$207.00 when it was exported by a state-owned firm, and only $77.2 when it was exported by a 
domestic private firm. For comparison, the average unit value of the same product, as exported 
by producers from the United States, the European Union, and Japan was $467.40.
7 Generally 
speaking, the unit values of the Chinese exports are lower than those from high-income countries. 
In this example, of the Chinese varieties, the processing-export monitor produced by a foreign 
firm located in a high-tech zone had the highest unit value, roughly 98% of the value of G3 
exports, suggesting that it may substitute closely for the high-income countries’ variety.  
 
As a second example, video cameras (HS code 852540) were also produced and exported by 
firms of various ownership, located in areas with different policy incentives. The average unit 
value for video cameras exported by by foreign-invested firms was $51.50 in 2005, compared to 
$30.20 for a similar camera made by state-owned firms. Both export type and firm location 
matter as well. Of processing-exports cameras produced by foreign-invested firms, the unit value 
was $154.6 for exports from a high-tech zone, $66.30 for those from outside any policy zone, 
and $51.50 for those assembled in an export processing zone. For normal-export cameras made 
by a foreign firm, the unit value was $21.60 for those from a high-tech zone, and only $13.20 for 
those from outside any policy zone. Again, processing exports from a high-tech zone had the 
highest unit value, and normal exports not from any policy zone had the lowest value. Cameras 
produced by foreign-invested firms generally had a higher unit value than did local firms. For 
comparison, the average unit value of a camera manufactured in the G3 countries (the United 
States, Japan and the European Union) was $331.50. In this example, even China’s priciest 
variety (a processing export made in a high-tech zone by a foreign firm) had a unit value only 
47% that of the average G3-exported camera. In this example, the variety of video camera made 
in China is unlikely to substitute closely for that of a wealthy country. 
 
                                                 
7 This figure is taken from information in the UN COMTRADE database; we thank Mark 
Gehlhar for providing this data.      13
While these examples are illustrative, we must turn to a regression framework to summarize 
patterns in the data more efficiently and systematically. Additionally, our regression framework 
explicitly accounts for differences in income across regions, as well as other factors that could 
account for the differences in unit value. Let ln(Unit_Valuerkt) denote the natural logarithm of the 
unit value of city r’s export of product k in year t. Our specification relates this variable to city 
by year fixed effects, product fixed effects, the share of export processing zones in a city’s export 
of a given product, the share of high-tech zones in that city’s export of that product 
(distinguished in regressions between processing and non-processing exports), the share of 
processing trade in that city’s export of that product from outside any policy zones, and other 
control variables. 
 
Ln rkt Unit_Value () = city_year_fixed + product_fixed
+ 1 β EPZ_sharerkt + 2 β High_tech_zone_Processing_Sharerkt  
+ 3 β Processing_trade_outside_anyzonerkt 
+β4High_tech_zone_nonprocessing_sharerkt +other_controls+   rkt μ
     (6) 
 
Note that city by year fixed effects are more general than either yearly fixed effects or city fixed 
effects. Our regression results are reported in Table 11. Column 1 shows that both export 
processing zones and high-tech zones are associated with higher unit values. Of the exports 
originated from the high-tech zones, those produced by processing trade are linked to higher unit 
values than those of non-processing trade. An increase of 10 percent in processing exports from a 
high-tech zone as a share of a city’s total exports is associated with an increase of 5.9% in unit 
value, whereas an increase of the same magnitude in the share of non-processing trade from 
high-tech zones is associated with a 2.1% increase in unit value. An increase of 10 percent in the 
export share of EPZs in a city’s total exports is associated with an increase of 2.1% in unit value. 
With regards to unit value, there is no difference between exports from an export processing 
zone and non-processing exports from a high-tech zone. In comparison, an increase of 10 percent 
in the share of processing exports originating outside any policy zone is associated with a 1.2% 
increase in unit value. Overall, processing trade appears to be associated with higher-quality 
varieties than ordinary trade. 
 
To show the role of foreign investment in upgrading the quality of products, column 2 of Table 
11 includes the respective shares of wholly foreign-owned and joint-venture firms in a city’s 
total exports (by HS-8) as additional regressors. Both new regressors have positive and 
statistically significant coefficients. An increase of 10 percent in the share of exports made by 
these two types of firms in a city’s total exports of a product tends to be associated with an 
increase in the unit value of the given product by 2.0% and 2.2%, respectively. This suggests that 
products from foreign-invested firms—assigned higher values—are generally of higher quality. 
 
Interestingly, this adjustment renders the share of EPZs statistically insignificant. The 
coefficients on the shares of processing and ordinary trade out of high-tech zones, and on the 
share of processing trade outside policy zones, while still positive and statistically significant, are 
now smaller in magnitude (by more than two standard deviations, in two out of the three cases). 
This suggests that part of the higher-unit-value effect, previously attributed to processing trade 
and high-tech zones, is in fact due to the presence of foreign-invested firms in these activities. As   14
noted above (Table 3b), during the sample period more than 95% of exports originating from 
EPZs and from processing trade in high-tech zones were produced by foreign-invested firms.      
 
Column 3 of Table 11 includes a regressor of the combined share of collective and private firms 
in a city’s total exports, and one of the share of state-owned firms (this column excludes that of 
shares held by foreign-invested firms). Column 4 of Table 11 includes the two types of foreign-
invested firms plus the combined share of the collective and domestic private firms (leaving out 
that of state-owned firms). The shares of exports made by collective and domestic private firms, 
and by state-owned firms, have negative and statistically significant coefficients, indicating that a 
larger share of Chinese domestic firms in a city’s exports is associated with a lower unit value of 
those exports. This confirms the intuition that, in a given HS-8 product line, foreign-invested 
firms in China produce relatively higher-quality varieties than do Chinese domestic firms.      
 
Taking these unit value results together, we conclude that processing trade (regardless of its 
origin), high-tech zones, and foreign invested firms are all independently associated with higher 
unit values, suggesting that they have each individually played a role in leading China to produce 




Are China’s exports competing head to head with those of high-income countries? This paper 
addresses this question by examining variations in export sophistication across different cities in 
China. It looks at both the overlap in product structure between a city’s exports and those of the 
advanced economies, and at the unit values of different products. 
 
Estimation shows that China’s export structure as a whole has begun increasingly to resemble 
that of the G3 advanced economies, and the unit values of its exports are also rising over time. If 
these patterns are generated entirely by the rise of processing trade, then there may not be much 
genuine increase in the sophistication of Chinese exports. If there has been increase in 
sophistication, but one brought about solely by foreign investment in China, then the economic 
profit associated with improved sophistication have accrued to foreign economies rather than to 
China’s. Of course, increased sophistication can also come from a higher level of local human 
capital, or from government policies set up expressly to promote the upgrading of industrial 
infrastructure, such as government initiatives establishing high-tech policy zones. Regional 
variations in the use of processing trade and high-tech zones, and the availability of skilled labor, 
are assessed in this paper to determine the relative importance of these factors. Econometric 
analysis conducted in this study helps to clarify this issue. 
 
(1) Cross-city differences in human capital are linked to cross-city differences in the 
sophistication of export structure. A higher level of human capital is associated with more 
sophisticated export structures in Chinese cities. 
 
(2) High-tech zones are associated both with more sophisticated export structures and with 
higher unit values. This indicates that the policy zones (especially ETDZs and HTIDZs) set up 
by central and local governments may have worked to induce firms to upgrade their product 
ladder to a higher level than they would have otherwise done. In other words, these policy zones   15
not only promoted processing trade, but also promoted improvements in the sophistication of 
China’s exports.   
 
(3) The export processing zones (EPZs) contribute both to the rising sophistication of China’s 
export structure and to the rising unit values of its exports. However, since only a tiny fraction of 
Chinese cities have EPZs and since most of their exports come from foreign-invested firms, 
EPZs do not contribute greatly to explaining cross-city differences in export sophistication. 
 
(4) Processing trade is not generally a major factor in explaining the cross-city differences in 
export structure sophistication. This can be seen in two ways. First, with regards to exports 
originating outside policy zones (which took up the lion’s share of China’s total exports during 
our sample period, about 42%), more processing trade is in fact associated with a lesser 
resemblance to the export structure of advanced countries. Second, with regard to exports 
originating inside of the high-tech zones, products associated with the processing trade do not 
appear to overlap more with advanced countries’ exports than do those associated with non-
processing trade.  
 
However, processing trade is significantly associated with higher unit values. How can our 
findings on export structure and unit values be reconciled? If processing-export production 
outside the policy zones is generally labor intensive, a higher share in a given city will increase 
the dissimilarity of that city’s export structure to that of the G3 advanced economies. However, 
processing exports could still be of higher quality (of greater sophistication) than normal trade 
exports in the same product line, if higher-quality materials are used to manufacture the former. 
In other words, processing trade moves China into the production and export of more 
sophisticated varieties within a given product category, but not necessarily within those product 
categories heavily exported by the G3 advanced economies.
8  
 
(5) The export share of foreign-invested firms in a Chinese city does not appear to play a major 
role in explaining cross-city differences in the sophistication level of export structures. If 
anything, joint-venture firms may create some divergence between a city’s export structure and 
that of the advanced economies. However, after controlling for processing trade, both types of 
foreign-invested firms are found to be strongly associated with higher export unit values. 
Therefore, foreign investment has been conducive to greater same-product sophistication in 
China. 
                                                 
8 The higher unit values associated with processing exports may simply reflect the higher cost of 
using imported inputs rather than domestically made inputs. This leaves open the question of 
whether processing exports generate more value added than do normal exports that use more 
local or domestic inputs. 
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Proof of the linear mapping between the similarity and dissimilarity indexes (equation (4)): 
 
Consider two economies, A and B, each having K sectors. Define Ak and Bk to be the share of 
sector k in each of the two economies’ exports. The sum of Ak (or Bk) over k equals 100. Without 
a loss of generality, we can divide the K sectors into two subsets, N and M, where N+M = K. Let 
N be indexed by i, and M by j. Assuming for i ∈ N, Ai  >  Bi, while for j ∈ M, Aj < Bj.  
 
EDI = Ak −
k
∑ Bk = (Ai −
i
∑ Bi)+ (Bj −
i
∑ A j) =
i ∑ Ai −
j ∑ A j +
j ∑ B j −
i ∑ Bi
= 200−2
j ∑ A j −2
i ∑ Bi = 200−2(
j ∑ Aj −
i ∑ Bi) = 200−2ESI
∴
i ∑ Ai +
j ∑ A j =100,
j ∑ B j +
i ∑ Bi =100
 
 
Therefore,  ) , ( ) , (
2
200 ∑ ∑ = =
−
k
k k i j B A Min B A
EDI
=   ESI  
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Table 1. Increasing overlaps in the export structure: China relative to the US, the EU, and Japan 
(1996-2005)  
Year  No. of HS-6 digit 
Product Lines exported 
by the High-income 
Countries (G3 (at least 
US $1 million) 
(1) 
Also exported by 





Fraction of the product 
lines exported by the G3 
but not by China 
 
 
(3) = 1 – (2)/(3) 
Export Dissimilarity Index 
(EDI) 
1996  4,126  2,942  28.7  133.7 
1997  4,123  3,042  26.2  132.5 
1998  4,121  3,041  26.2  130.8 
1999  4,120  3,024  26.6  129.2 
2000  4,116  3,172  22.9  125.5 
2001  4,118  3,184  22.7  124.8 
2002  4,184  3,306  21.0  125.4 
2003  4,182  3,408  18.5  126.1 
2004  4,186  3,515  16.0  123.1 
2005  4,179  3,609  13.6  121.5 
 
Data source: Authors’ computation based on trade statistics from the China Customs Administration and 
on G3 data downloaded from the UN COMTRADE database. The EDI is computed based on Equation 
(2), explained in the text: smaller values indicate greater overlaps. 
 
  Yearly benchmark  2004 benchmark 





Value share of 
product that 
G3 exports but 
China does not 







Value share of 
product that G3 
exports but China 
does not as G3 
total exports 
1996  4143  133.7  1.26  4213  141.6  5.68 
1997  4143  132.5  1.27  4213  140.4  5.65 
1998  4143  130.8  1.21  4213  138.9  5.73 
1999  4143  129.2  0.92  4213  136.9  5.63 
2000  4143  125.5  0.97  4213  133.0  5.95 
2001  4143  124.8  0.95  4213  130.9  5.77 
2002  4213  125.4  0.60  4213  128.7  0.60 
2003  4213  126.1  0.60  4213  127.8  0.60 
2004  4213  123.1  0.77  4213  123.1  0.77 
2005  4212  121.5  0.80  4213  119.5  0.80 
 
Data source: Authors computation based on official trade statistics from the China Customs 
Administration and G3 data downloaded from WITS. 
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Table 2: Breakdown of China’s Exports by firm ownership, 1995-2006 (%) 
Year SOE  Joint  Venture  Wholly  Foreign-
owned 
Collective Private 
1995 66.7  19.8  11.7  1.5  0.0 
1996 57.0  24.9  15.7  2.0  0.0 
1997 56.2  23.9  17.1  2.5  0.0 
1998 52.6  24.1  20.0  2.9  0.1 
1999 50.5  23.2  22.2  3.5  0.3 
2000 46.7  24.2  23.8  4.2  1.0 
2001 42.6  24.1  25.9  5.3  2.0 
2002 37.7  22.7  29.5  5.8  4.2 
2003 31.5  21.5  33.3  5.7  7.9 
2004 25.9  21.0  36.1  5.4  11.7 
2005 22.2  19.9  38.4  4.8  14.7 
2006 19.7  18.7  39.5  4.2  17.8 
Average 
1996-2004 
39.8 22.7  27.8  4.7 4.9 
 
Data source: Authors’ computation based on official trade statistics from the China Custom 
Administration. 
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1995 10.6  0  3.2  2.1  39.8  42.1  2.2 
1996 8.7  0  3.9  1.8  45.2  38.3  2.0 
1997 8.8  0  4.6  1.7  43.9  39.0  1.9 
1998 8.2  0  5.5  1.9  45.5  36.9  1.9 
1999 7.0  0  6.4  2.2  45.5  37.0  1.9 
2000 7.1  0  7.0  2.6  43.3  38.2  1.8 
2001 6.8  0.1 7.4  2.8  43.0  38.0  1.9 
2002 6.2  0.7 8.0  3.0  42.2  37.6  2.3 
2003 5.3  2.4 9.5  3.4  39.6  37.1  2.7 
2004 4.4  3.6  11.0  3.6  37.7  36.4  3.2 
2005 4.3  4.6  11.8  3.6  35.6  36.8  3.5 
1996-2004 
average 
6.3 1.3  8.0  2.8  41.7  37.4  2.4 
 
Table 3b: Firm structure across trade and policy zones, 1996-2004 (%) 




























State Owned  23.7  0.0  4.8  58.3  28.3  62.5  44.3 
Joint Venture  34.3  3.4  33.4  16.9  29.2  13.1  13.0 
Wholly Foreign  36.3  96.0  61.5  16.3  38.0  6.6  24.0 
Collective 1.7  0.6  0.3  1.4  3.1  8.2  4.6 
Private 3.8  0.0  0.1  7.1  1.5  9.5  10.4 
Total  99.9  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  96.3 
1996 
State Owned  29.4    15.6  79.7  40.5  85.7  63.0 
Joint Venture  39.5    37.8  13.3  35.2  9.4  10.3 
Wholly Foreign  30.0    46.2  6.2  22.4  2.2  11.3 
Collective 0.9    0.4  0.9  1.9  2.6  3.4 
Private 0.0    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2 
Total  99.8    100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  88.2 
2004 
State Owned  20.5  0.0  2.5  44.0  18.3  41.8  30.3 
Joint Venture  30.5  3.0  27.2  16.4  26.3  15.0  15.5 
Wholly Foreign  37.9  96.5  69.8  23.2  47.9  9.4  29.8 
Collective 2.2  0.4  0.2  1.4  3.4  10.3  4.0 
Private 9.0  0.0  0.3  15.1  4.0  23.5  19.7 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  99.4 
 
Data source: Authors computed based on official trade statistics from China Custom Administration. 
† Including international aid, compensation trade, goods on consignment, border trade, goods for foreign 
contracted projects, goods on lease, outward processing, barter trade, warehouse trade, and entrepôt trade 
by bonded area. 
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Table 4a: Summary statistics for city-level variables 
 N  Mean  Median  Std  Dev  MIN  MAX 
GMP per capita (in log)  1981 8.97 8.89 0.63 7.23  11.48 
GMP (in log)  1981  14.74  14.71  0.96  11.16  18.13 
Student Enrollment in Colleges and 
Universities as a Share of Non-
Agricultural Population 
1986 0.016 0.009 0.019 0.000 0.155 
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in high-tech zones 
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N  1986  1986 1986 1986  1986 
Mean 5.24  0.259  0.0144 0.0068  0.0004 
Median 5.26  0.196  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Std Dev  0.07  0.233  0.0594  0.0253  0.0057 
MIN 4.84 0.000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
MAX 5.30  0.996  0.5940  0.4206  0.1534 
State-owned Firms 
N  1981  1981 1981 1981  1981 
Mean 5.24  0.168  0.0016 0.0058  0.0000 
Median 5.27  0.103  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Std Dev  0.06  0.200  0.0105  0.0327  0.0000 
MIN 4.92 0.000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
MAX 5.30  0.990  0.1822  0.5102  0.0013 
Joint-Venture Firms 
N  1835  1835 1835 1835  1835 
Mean 5.27  0.430  0.0263 0.0143  0.0004 
Median 5.28  0.418  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Std Dev  0.04  0.321  0.0875  0.0663  0.0083 
MIN 4.95 0.000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
MAX 5.30  1.000  0.6985  0.9543  0.3256 
Wholly Foreign-owned Firms 
N  1552  1552 1552 1552  1552 
Mean 5.27  0.417  0.0448 0.0132  0.0019 
Median 5.29  0.378  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Std Dev  0.04  0.355  0.1433  0.0481  0.0214 
MIN 4.99 0.000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
MAX 5.30  1.000  0.9470  0.9898  0.5395 
Collectively-owned Firms 
N  1640  1640 1640 1640  1640 
Mean 5.28  0.117  0.0021 0.0037  0.0010 
Median 5.29  0.001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Std Dev  0.03  0.203  0.0218  0.0228  0.0216 
MIN 5.10 0.000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
MAX 5.30  1.000  0.5497  0.3115  0.5919 
Private Firms 
N  1264  1264 1264 1264  1264 
Mean 5.27  0.055  0.0025 0.0143  0.0000 
Median 5.29  0.000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Std Dev  0.04  0.141  0.0378  0.0692  0.0002 
MIN 4.96 0.000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
MAX 5.30  1.000  1.0000  1.0000  0.0051   23
Table 5: What explains cross-city export structure? Export Structure Dissimilarity between 
Chinese cities (all firms) and the G3 countries  
 Explanatory Variables  Yearly benchmark 2004  benchmark 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
-0.351*** -0.382*** -0.350*** -0.384*** -0.552*** -0.594*** -0.544*** -0.591***  Export Processing Zone Exports as a Share of 
Total City Exports  (0.074) (0.055) (0.071) (0.053) (0.116) (0.087) (0.111) (0.084) 
-0.065*** -0.070*** -0.067*** -0.073*** -0.083*** -0.089*** -0.082*** -0.090***  Processing exports in High-tech Zones as a 
Share of Total City Exports  (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) 
-0.087* -0.108**  -0.093**  -0.115** -0.087*  -0.116*  -0.092* -0.122**  Non-processing exports in High-tech Zones as a 
Share of Total City Exports  (0.045) (0.053) (0.044) (0.053) (0.049) (0.061) (0.049) (0.061) 
0.005* 0.004  0.004  0.002 0.006* 0.004 0.005* 0.003  Processing exports outside economic zones as a 
Share of Total City Exports  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
-0.225***  -0.229***  -0.309***  -0.315***   Student Enrollment in Institutions of Higher 
Education as a Share of the City Non-
Agricultural Population 
(0.066)  (0.066)  (0.073)  (0.072)  
  -0.006**   -0.007***  -0.010***  -0.010***  GMP per capita  
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
-0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**  -0.003*  -0.003*  -0.003** -0.003**  Gross Metropolitan Product (GMP)  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
   0.001  0.004     -0.004  -0.000  Foreign-invested firms’ share in city exports 
   (0.006)  (0.006)     (0.006)  (0.007) 
   0.010***  0.010***     0.009**  0.009**  Joint venture firms’ share in city exports 
   (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.004)  (0.004) 
City Fixed Effects  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year  Fixed  Effects    Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust,  Cluster(city)  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 
R-squared 0.98  0.98  0.98  0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.97 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   24
Table 6: State-owned firms’ Export Structure Dissimilarity relative to the G3 countries 
Explanatory Variables  Yearly benchmark 2004  benchmark 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
-11.88*** -13.21*** -12.16*** -13.49*** -18.84*** -20.83*** -18.97*** -20.96***  Export Processing Zone Exports as a 
Share of Total City Exports  (4.040) (4.427) (4.016) (4.411) (5.449) (6.099) (5.431) (6.089) 
-0.010 -0.023 -0.013 -0.027 -0.023 -0.044 -0.025 -0.045  Processing exports in High-tech Zones 
as a Share of Total City Exports  (0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.093) (0.091) (0.092) (0.091) 
-0.123** -0.136** -0.124** -0.138** -0.151** -0.171** -0.150** -0.170**  Non-processing exports in High-tech 
Zones as a Share of Total City Exports  (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.067) 
0.007*** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.007** 0.007*** 0.007** 0.008*** 0.007**  Processing exports outside economic 
zones as a Share of Total City Exports  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
-0.166**  -0.170**   -0.255***    -0.258***    Student Enrollment in Institutions of 
Higher Education as a Share of the City 
Non-Agricultural Population 
(0.069)  (0.068)  (0.075)  (0.074)  
 -0.005**  -0.005**   -0.008***    -0.008***  GMP per capita  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
-0.002* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003*  Gross Metropolitan Product (GMP)  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
   0.001  0.002     -0.003  -0.002  Foreign-invested firms share in city 
exports     (0.007)  (0.007)     (0.007)  (0.007) 
   0.006  0.005     0.004  0.003 
   (0.005)  (0.005)     (0.005)  (0.005) 
Joint venture firms share in city exports 
(0.023) (0.035) (0.023) (0.036) (0.023) (0.043) (0.023) (0.044) 
City Fixed Effects  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year  Fixed  Effects  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust  (clustered  by  city)  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 
R-squared 0.97  0.97  0.97  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  25
 
Table 7: Wholly foreign-owned firms’ Export Structure Dissimilarity Relative to the G3 countries 
Explanatory Variables  Yearly benchmarks 2004  benchmark 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
-0.095 -0.097* -0.112  -0.115  Export Processing Zone Exports as a 
Share of Total City Exports  (0.059) (0.057) (0.073) (0.071) 
-0.017  -0.016 -0.024* -0.022  Processing exports in High-tech Zones as 
a Share of Total City Exports  (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
-0.013 -0.013 -0.019 -0.019  Non-processing exports in High-tech 
Zones as a Share of Total City Exports  (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.007  Processing exports outside economic 
zones as a Share of Total City Exports  (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) 
-0.078  -0.080   Student Enrollment in Institutions of 
Higher Education as a Share of the City 
Non-Agricultural Population 
(0.063)  (0.074)  
 -0.012**  -0.012**  GMP per capita  
 (0.005)  (0.006) 
-0.005* -0.003  -0.005  -0.003  Gross Metropolitan Product (GMP)  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
City Fixed Effects  Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects   Y  Y  Y  Y 
Robust (clustered by city)   Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  1548 1548 1548 1548 
R-squared  0.95 0.95 0.81 0.81 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 8: Joint-ventures firms’ Exports Structure Dissimilarity relative to the G3 countries 
Explanatory Variables  Yearly benchmark 2004  benchmark 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.013 -0.002 0.000 -0.016  Export Processing Zone Exports as a Share 
of Total City Exports  (0.027) (0.030) (0.033) (0.036) 
-0.005 -0.006 -0.014  -0.015*  Processing exports in High-tech Zones as a 
Share of Total City Exports  (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001  Non-processing exports in High-tech 
Zones as a Share of Total City Exports  (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
0.001 0.000  0.003*  0.002  Processing exports outside economic zones 
as a Share of Total City Exports  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
-0.094**  -0.104**   Student Enrollment in Institutions of 
Higher Education as a Share of the City 
Non-Agricultural Population 
(0.039)  (0.035)  
 -0.004*   -0.005**  GMP per capita  
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  Gross Metropolitan Product (GMP)  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
City Fixed Effects  Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Robust (clustered by city)  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  1831 1831 1831 1831 
R-squared  0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 9: Collectively-owned firms’ Export Structure Dissimilarity relative to the G3 countries 
Explanatory Variables  Yearly benchmark 2004  benchmark 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
0.003 -0.005 0.002 -0.006 -0.003 -0.010 -0.004 -0.011  Export Processing Zone Exports as a 
Share of Total City Exports  (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
0.028** 0.020 0.028** 0.019 0.029** 0.020* 0.028**  0.020  Processing exports in High-tech Zones as 
a Share of Total City Exports  (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
-0.070** -0.089** -0.071** -0.089** -0.066** -0.084** -0.066** -0.084**  Non-processing exports in High-tech 
Zones as a Share of Total City Exports  (0.029) (0.036) (0.029) (0.036) (0.028) (0.034) (0.029) (0.035) 
0.009*** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.007** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** Processing exports outside economic 
zones as a Share of Total City Exports  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
-0.38***  -0.39***  -0.38***  -0.38***   Student Enrollment in Institutions of 
Higher Education as a Share of the City 
Non-Agricultural Population 
(0.075)  (0.075)  (0.078)  (0.078)  
 -0.016**  -0.016**  -0.016**  -0.016**  Chinese GMP per capita  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
-0.004 -0.005* -0.004 -0.005* -0.004 -0.006* -0.004 -0.006*  Chinese Gross Metropolitan Product 
(GMP)   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
   -0.010  -0.011    -0.013  -0.013  FIE firms’ share in city exports 
   (0.008)  (0.009)    (0.008)  (0.009) 
   0.004  0.001    0.003  -0.000  Joint venture firms’ share in city exports 
   (0.005)  (0.006)    (0.005)  (0.006) 
City Fixed Effects  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year  Fixed  Effects    Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust  (clustered  by  city)  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  1636 1636 1636 1636 1636 1636 1636 1636 
R-squared 0.89  0.87  0.89  0.88 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.86 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   28
Table 10: Private firms’ Export Structure Dissimilarity relative to the G3 countries 
Explanatory Variables  Yearly benchmark 2004  benchmark 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
-14.28*** -15.86*** -14.02*** -15.51*** -14.97*** -16.68*** -14.44*** -16.00***  Export Processing Zone Exports as a 
Share of Total City Exports  (3.640) (3.825) (3.589) (3.896) (3.778) (4.016) (3.782) (4.224) 
-0.006 -0.012 -0.003 -0.009 -0.005 -0.010 0.002 -0.003  Processing exports in High-tech Zones 
as a Share of Total City Exports  (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
-0.100 -0.109 -0.094 -0.103 -0.096 -0.105 -0.085 -0.093  Non-processing exports in High-tech 
Zones as a Share of Total City Exports  (0.072) (0.070) (0.066) (0.064) (0.072) (0.070) (0.061) (0.059) 
0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.010  0.010*  Processing exports outside economic 
zones as a Share of Total City Exports  (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
-0.655***  -0.645***  -0.660***  -0.639***   Student Enrollment in Institutions of 
Higher Education as a Share of the 
City Non-Agricultural Population 
(0.181)  (0.170)  (0.186)  (0.166)  
 -0.048**   -0.050***   -0.040**  -0.043**  GMP per capita  
 (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.018) 
-0.019 -0.024** -0.021 -0.025** -0.014 -0.020* -0.017  -0.022**  Gross Metropolitan Product  
(0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) 
   -0.086***  -0.091***     -0.179**  -0.184**  FIE firm export share 
   (0.031)  (0.030)    (0.086)  (0.087) 
   -0.003  -0.009    -0.009  -0.015  Joint venture firm exports share 
   (0.015)  (0.015)    (0.018)  (0.018) 
City Fixed Effects  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year  Fixed  Effects    Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust  (clustered  by  city)  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 1262 
R-squared 0.75  0.74  0.76  0.76 0.63 0.62 0.68 0.67 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 11: What explains the cross-city difference in the unit values of exports? 
Explanatory Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.209** 0.068  0.050  0.064  Export Processing Zone Exports as a Share of Total City 
Exports  (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)  (0.058) 
0.589** 0.429** 0.428** 0.434** Processing exports in High-tech Zones as a Share of 
Total City Exports  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013) 
0.206** 0.171** 0.172** 0.173** Non-processing exports in High-tech Zones as a Share 
of Total City Exports  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) 
0.119** 0.117** 0.117** 0.119** Processing exports outside economic zones as a Share of 
Total City Exports  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) 
FIE firm export share    0.198**   0.179**
   (0.005)    (0.005) 
Joint venture firm exports share    0.222**   0.207**
   (0.004)    (0.004) 
Collective and Private firm export share      -0.290** -0.094**
     (0.005)  (0.004) 
SOE firm export share      -0.196**  
     (0.004)   
Product Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
City_Year Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Number of  Unique Cities  238  238  238  238 
Number of Unique products  6,473  6,473  6,473  6,473 
Observations 1,256,999  1,256,999  1,256,999  1,256,999 
Adjusted R-squared  0.794  0.794  0.794  0.794 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of the Unit Value of HS 6-digit products, from 1996 to 2004.  
The regressions include city by year fixed effects and product fixed effects. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses. ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix Table 1: Definition of key variables and their data sources 
Dependent variables  Description  Data Sources 




irft rft s s abs =   EDI ∑ −  
 
Absolute export structure dissimilarity 
index 
Calculated by the authors from 
the HS 6-digit level. Chinese City 
exports based on official China 
Customs Statistics. Data on US, 
EU15 and Japanese exports 
downloaded from WITS 
Explanatory variables    
GMP  Gross Metropolitan Product (10,000 yuan)  China City data, China Data 
Online 
GMPpcrt = 100 GMPr / POPr  Chinese GMP per capita (yuan)   China City data, China Data 
Online 
SKILLrt = 100 (No. of College 
Students)rt /(non-agricultural 
population)rt   
Student Enrollment in Institutions of 
Higher Education as a Share of the City 
Non-Agricultural Population 
China City data, China Data 
Online 
EPZ_sharerft  Export Processing Zone Exports as a 
Share of Total City Exports 
China Customs Statistics 
High_tech_zone_processing_sharerft  Processing exports in the two High-tech 
Zones as a Share of Total City Exports  
China Customs Statistics 
High_tech_zone_nonprocessing_sharerft  Non-processing exports in the two High-
tech Zones as a Share of Total City 
Exports 
China Customs Statistics 
Processing_outside_anyzone_sharerft  Processing exports outside policy zones as 
a Share of Total City Exports 
China Customs Statistics 
Expfieshrft  FIE firm exports as share of Total City 
Exports 
China Customs Statistics 
Expjonshrft  Joint venture firm exports as Share of 
Total City Exports 
China Customs Statistics 
expothshrft  Collective and Private firm exports as  
Share of Total City Exports 
China Customs Statistics 
expsoeshrft  SOE firm exports as Share of Total City 
Exports 
China Customs Statistics   31
Appendix Table 2: Years of establishment of economic zones, by incentive type 
City Code  City Name  Special 
Economic 
Zone 







1100  Beijing CY    1996  1996  2001 
1200  Tianjin CY    1996  1996  2001 
1301  Shijiazhuang     1996   
1303  Qinhuangdao    1996    2005 
1306  Baoding     1996   
1401  Taiyuan    2003  1996   
1502  Baotou     1997   
2101  Shenyang    1996  1996   
2102  Dalian    1996  1996  2001 
2103  Anshan     1996   
2201  Changchun    1996  1996   
2202  Jilin     1996   
2301  Harbin    1996  1996   
2306  Daqing     1996   
3100  Shanghai CY    1996  1996  2001 
3201  Nanjing     1996  2004 
3202  Wuxi     1997  2003 
3204  Changzhou     1997   
3205  Suzhou    1996  1997  2001 
3206  Nantong    1996    2003 
3207  Lianyungang    1996    2004 
3211  Zhenjiang       2004 
3301  Hangzhou    1996  1996  2001 
3302  Ningbo    1996    2004 
3303  Wenzhou    1996    
3401  Hefei    2005  1996   
3402  Wuhu    1996    2003 
3501  Fuzhou    1996  1996   
3502  Xiamen  1995    1996  2002 
3601  Nanchang     1996   
3701  Jinan     1996   
3702  Qingdao    1996  1997  2004 
3703  Zibo     1999   
3706  Yantai    1996    2001 
3707  Weifang     1996   
3710  Weihai     1996  2001 
4101  Zhengzhou     1996  2005 
4103  Luoyang     1997   
4201  Wuhan    1996  1996  2001   32
4206  Xiangfan     1997   
4301  Changsha     1996   
4302  Zhuzhou     2000   
4401  Guangzhou    1996  1996  2001 
4403  Shenzhen  1995    1996  2002 
4404  Zhuhai  1995    1996   
4405  Shantou  1995      
4406  Foshan     1998   
4408  Zhanjiang    1996    
4413  Huizhou     1996   
4420  Zhongshan     1996   
4501  Nanning     1996   
4503  Guilin     1996   
4505  Beihai       2005 
4601  Haikou  1995    1996   
4602  Sanya  1995      
5000  Chongqing    2002  2002  2002 
5101  Chengdu    2001  1996  2001 
5107  Mianyan     1996   
5201  Guiyang     1996   
5301  Kunming     1996   
6101  Xi'an     1996  2004 
6103  Baoji     1997   
6104  Xianyang     2002   
6201  Lanzhou     1996   
6301  Xining    2005    
6501  Urumqi    1996  1997   
 
Note: Cities that did not have any policy zone between 1996 and 2005 are not listed.   33
Appendix Table 3: Chinese cities included in the sample used in regressions (238 in total) 
Code  City Name  Province  Code  City Name  Province  Code  City Name  Province 
1100 Beijing  Beijing  3404 Huainan    Anhui    4313  Huaihua  Hunan   
1200  Tianjin  Tianjin  3405  Maanshang  Anhui    4401  Guangzhou   Guangdong   
1301  Shijiazhuang   Hebei    3406  Huaibei  Anhui    4402  Shaoguan  Guangdong   
1302  Tangshan   Hebei    3407  Tongling  Anhui    4403  Shenzhen  Guangdong   
1303  Qinhuangdao   Hebei    3408  Anqing  Anhui    4404  Zhuhai  Guangdong   
1304  Handan   Hebei    3409  Huangshan  Anhui    4405  Shantou   Guangdong   
1305  Xingtai  Hebei    3410  Fuyang  Anhui    4406  Foshan  Guangdong   
1306  Baoding   Hebei    3411  Suxian  Anhui    4407  Jiangmen  Guangdong   
1307  Zhangjiakou   Hebei    3412  Chuxian  Anhui    4408  Zhanjiang   Guangdong   
1308  Chongde  Hebei    3413  Liuan  Anhui    4409  Maoming  Guangdong   
1309  Changzhou   Hebei    3414  Xuancheng  Anhui    4412  Zhaoqing  Guangdong   
1310  Langfang  Hebei    3415  Chaohu  Anhui    4413  Huizhou  Guangdong   
1401  Taiyuan   Shanxi    3416  Chizhou  Anhui    4414  Meizhou  Guangdong   
1402  Datong   Shanxi    3502  Xiamen   Fujian    4415  Shanwei  Guangdong   
1403  Yangquan   Shanxi    3503  Putian  Fujian    4416  Heyuan  Guangdong   
1404  Changzhi  Shanxi    3504  Sanming  Fujian    4417  Yangjiang  Guangdong   
1405  Jincheng  Shanxi    3505  Quanzhou  Fujian    4418  Qingyuan  Guangdong   
1406  Suozhou  Shanxi    3506  Zhangzhou  Fujian    4419  Dongguan  Guangdong   
1410  Jinzhong  Shanxi    3507  Nanpin  Fujian    4420  Zhongshan  Guangdong   
1501  Hohhot   Inner Mongolia AR   3509  Longyian  Fujian    4421  Chaozhou  Guangdong   
1502  Baotou   Inner Mongolia AR   3601  Nanchang   Jiangxi    4424  Jieyang  Guangdong   
1503  Wuhai  Inner Mongolia AR   3602  Jingdezhen   Jiangxi    4501  Nanning   Guangxi Zhuan 
AR 
1504  Chifeng  Inner Mongolia AR   3603  Pingxiang  Jiangxi    4502  Liuzhou   Guangxi Zhuan 
AR 
1507  Holunbeir  Inner Mongolia AR   3604  Jiujiang  Jiangxi    4503  Guilin   Guangxi Zhuan 
AR 
2101  Shenyang   Liaoning    3605  Xingyu  Jiangxi    4504  Wuzhou  Guangxi Zhuan 
AR 
2102  Dalian   Liaoning    3606  Yingtan  Jiangxi    4505  Beihai  Guangxi Zhuan 
AR 
2103  Anshan   Liaoning    3607  Ganzhou  Jiangxi    4507  Baise  Guangxi Zhuan 
AR 
2104  Fushen  Liaoning    3611  Fuzhou   Jiangxi    4508  Hechi  Guangxi Zhuan 
AR 
2105  Benxi   Liaoning    3701  Jinan   Shandong    4509  Qinzhou  Guangxi Zhuan 
AR 
2106  Dandong   Liaoning    3702  Qingdao   Shandong    4516  Hezhou Area  Guangxi Zhuan 
AR 
2107  Jinzhou   Liaoning    3703  Zibo   Shandong    4601  Haikou   Hainan   
2108  Yingkou  Liaoning    3704  Zaozhuang  Shandong    4602  Sanya  Hainan   
2109  Fuxin   Liaoning    3705  Dongying  Shandong    5000  Chongqing   Chongqing  
2110  Liaoyang   Liaoning    3706  Yantai  Shandong    5101  Chengdu   Sichuan   
2111  Panjin  Liaoning    3707  Weifang  Shandong    5103  Zigong   Sichuan   
2112  Tieling  Liaoning    3708  Jining  Shandong    5104  Panzhihua  Sichuan   
2113  Chaoyang  Liaoning    3709  Taian  Shandong    5105  Luzhou  Sichuan   
2201  Changchun   JiIin    3710  Weihai  Shandong    5106  Deyang  Sichuan   
2202  Jilin   JiIin    3711  Rizhao  Shandong    5107  Mianyan  Sichuan   
2203  Sipin  JiIin    3713  Dezhou  Shandong    5108  Guangyuan  Sichuan   
2204  Liaoyuan   JiIin    3714  Liaochen  Shandong    5109  Suining  Sichuan     34
2205  Tonghua  JiIin    3715  Linyi  Shandong    5110  Neijiang  Sichuan   
2209  Baicheng  JiIin    3720  Laiwu  Shandong    5111  Leshan  Sichuan   
2301  Harbin   Heilongjing    4101  Zhengzhou   Henan    5114  Yibin  Sichuan   
2302  Qiqihar   Heilongjing    4102  Kaifeng   Henan    5115  Nanchong  Sichuan   
2303  Jixi   Heilongjing    4103  Luoyang   Henan    5116  Daxian  Sichuan   
2304  Hegang   Heilongjing    4104  Pindinshan  Henan    5201  Guiyang   Guizhou   
2305  Shuangyashan  Heilongjing    4105  Anyang   Henan    5202  Liupanshan  Guizhou   
2306  Daqing  Heilongjing    4106  Hebi  Henan    5203  Zunyi  Guizhou   
2307  Yichun  Heilongjing    4107  Xinxiang   Henan    5301  Kunming   Yunnan   
2308  Jiamusi   Heilongjing    4108  Jiaozhuo  Henan    5303  Zhaotong  Yunnan   
2309  Qitaiher  Heilongjing    4109  Puyang  Henan    5304  Qujing  Yunnan   
2310  Mudanjiang   Heilongjing    4110  Xuchang  Henan    5306  Yuxi  Yunnan   
2311  Heihe  Heilongjing    4111  Luohe  Henan    5314  Lijiang  Yunnan   
3100 ShanghaiCY  Shanghai  CY  4112 Sanmenxia  Henan    6101  Xi'an   Shanxi   
3201  Nanjing   Jiangsu    4113  Shangqiu  Henan    6102  Tongzhou  Shanxi   
3202  Wuxi   Jiangsu    4116  Nanyang  Henan    6103  Baoji   Shanxi   
3203  Xuzhou   Jiangsu    4117  Xinyang  Henan    6104  Xianyang  Shanxi   
3204  Changzhou   Jiangsu    4201  Wuhan   Hubei    6105  Weinan  Shanxi   
3206  Nantong   Jiangsu    4202  Huangshi  Hubei    6106  Hanzhong  Shanxi   
3207  Lianyungang   Jiangsu    4203  Shiyan  Hubei    6108  Shangluo  Shanxi   
3208  Huaiyin  Jiangsu    4205  Yichang  Hubei    6109  Yanan  Shanxi   
3209  Yancheng  Jiangsu    4206  Xiangfan  Hubei    6110  Yulin  Shanxi   
3210  Yangzhou   Jiangsu    4207  Ezhou  Hubei    6201  Lanzhou   Gansu   
3211  Zhenjiang   Jiangsu    4208  Jingmen  Hubei    6202  Jiayuguan  Gansu   
3217  Suqian  Jiangsu    4209  Huanggang  Hubei    6203  Jinchang  Gansu   
3301  Hangzhou   Zhejiang    4210  Xiaogan  Hubei    6204  Baiyin  Gansu   
3302  Ningbo   Zhejiang    4211  Xianning  Hubei    6205  Tianshiu  Gansu   
3303  Wenzhou   Zhejiang    4212  Jingzhou  Hubei    6206  Jiuquan  Gansu   
3304  Jiaxing  Zhejiang    4301  Changsha   Hunan    6207  Zhangye  Gansu   
3305  Huzhou  Zhejiang    4302  Zhuzhou  Hunan    6208  Wuwei  Gansu   
3306  Shaoxing  Zhejiang    4303  Xiangtan   Hunan    6211  Pinliang  Gansu   
3307  Jinhua  Zhejiang    4304  Hengyang   Hunan    6212  Qingyang  Gansu   
3308  Quzhou  Zhejiang    4305  Shaoyang  Hunan    6301  Xining   Qinghai   
3309  Zhoushan  Zhejiang    4306  Yueyang  Hunan    6401  Yinchuan  Ningxia Hui AR 
3311  Taizhou  Zhejiang    4307  Changde  Hunan    6402  Shizuishan  Ningxia Hui AR 
3401  Hefei   Anhui    4309  Yiyang  Hunan    6501  Urumqi  Xinjiang AR  
3402  Wuhu   Anhui    4310  Loudi  Hunan    6502  Kelamayi  Xinjiang AR  
3403  Bangbu  Anhui    4311  Chenzhou  Hunan          
   35
Appendix Table 4: HS products excluded from export data   
HS Code  Description  HS Code  Description 
01-24  Agricultural products  25-27  Mineral products 
4103  Other raw hides and skins (fresh, o  8002  Tin waste and scrap. 
4104  Tanned or crust hides and skins of  8101  Tungsten (wolfram) and articles the 
4105  Tanned or crust skins of sheep or l  8102  Molybdenum and articles thereof, in 
4106  Tanned or crust hides and skins of  8103  Tantalum and articles thereof, incl 
4402  Wood charcoal (including shell or n  8104  Magnesium and articles thereof, inc 
4403  Wood in the rough, whether or not s  8105  Cobalt mattes and other intermediate 
7201  Pig iron and spiegeleisen in pigs,  8106  Bismuth and articles thereof, inclu 
7202  Ferro-alloys.  8107  Cadmium and articles thereof, inclu 
7204  Ferrous waste and scrap; remelting  8108  Titanium and articles thereof, incl 
7404  Copper waste and scrap.  8109  Zirconium and articles thereof, inc 
7501  Nickel mattes, nickel oxide sinters  8110  Antimony and articles thereof, incl 
7502  Unwrought nickel.  8111  Manganese and articles thereof, inc 
7503  Nickel waste and scrap.  8112  Beryllium, chromium, germanium, van 
7601  Unwrought aluminium.  8113  Cermets and articles thereof, inclu 
7602  Aluminium waste and scrap.  9701  Paintings, drawings and pastels, ex 
7801  Unwrought lead.  9702  Original engravings, prints and lit 
7802  Lead waste and scrap.  9703  Original sculptures and statuary, i 
7901  Unwrought zinc.  9704  Postage or revenue stamps, stamp-po 
7902  Zinc waste and scrap.  9705  Collections and collectors' pieces 
8001  Unwrought tin.  9706  Antiques of an age exceeding one hundred years 
530521  Coconut, abaca (Manila hemp or Musa  811252  Beryllium, chromium, germanium, van   36
Appendix Table 5: correlation matrix for key variables (all firms) 
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Export Dissimilarity Index (in log)  1.00                
GMP per capita (logged)  -0.61  1.00               
GMP  (logged)  -0.72  0.62  1.00           
Share of joint venture firm exports    -0.13 0.09 0.12 1.00             
Share of FIE firm exports  -0.35 0.26 0.23 0.05 1.00           
Student Enrollment in Colleges and 
Universities as a Share of Non-
Agricultural Population 
-0.47  0.41 0.49 -0.06 0.03  1.00         
Share of processing exports outside policy 
zones  
-0.20 0.08 0.05 0.40 0.33  -0.12  1.00       
Share of processing exports in the two 
High-tech Zones  
-0.47 0.32 0.34 0.09 0.43 0.19  0.03  1.00     
Share of non-processing exports in the two 
High-tech Zones  
-0.40 0.30 0.35 0.05 0.14  0.30 -0.03  0.42  1.00   
Share of Export Processing Zone   -0.27 0.18 0.19 0.02 0.14  0.16 0.00  0.19  0.27  1.00 
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Appendix Table 6. Correlation matrix for key variables, unit value (all firms) 




































Unit Value of City Exports (in log)  1.00                 
Share of Joint Venture firm exports  0.03  1.00               
Share of FIE firm exports  0.01  -0.07  1.00             
Share of processing exports outside 
policy zones 
0.01  0.29 0.30 1.00        
Share of processing exports in the 
two High-tech Zones  
0.05  0.10  0.19  -0.01  1.00      
Share of non-processing exports in 
the two High-tech Zones 
0.05  0.04  0.05  -0.06  0.02  1.00    
Share of Export Processing Zone  0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00  0.00  0.00 1.00     
Share of SOE exports  -0.01  -0.52 -0.43 -0.30  -0.14 -0.05  -0.03 1.00   
Share of Collective and Private firm 
exports 
-0.03 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10  -0.04  -0.01  0.00 -0.57  1.00   38
Appendix Table 7: What explains cross-city export structure?  
EDI and ESI in levels as dependent variables 
 Explanatory Variables  Export Dissimilarity Index (EDI)  Exports Similarity Index (ESI) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
-45.89*** -50.98***  -46.02***  -51.63***  22.94***  25.49***  23.01***  25.81***  Export Processing Zone Exports as a Share 
of Total City Exports 
(9.01)  (6.62)  (8.58) (6.54) (4.50) (3.31) (4.29) (3.27) 
-10.73***  -11.49***  -11.22***  -12.16***  5.36*** 5.75*** 5.61*** 6.08***  Processing exports in High-tech Zones as a 
Share of Total City Exports 
(2.88)  (3.34)  (2.82) (3.27) (1.44) (1.67) (1.41) (1.64) 
-14.70**  -18.24**  -15.88**  -19.47**  7.35** 9.12** 7.94** 9.73**  Non-processing exports in High-tech Zones 
as a Share of Total City Exports 
(7.37)  (8.72)  (7.35) (8.65) (3.68) (4.36) (3.68) (4.33) 
0.956* 0.725  0.722  0.445  -0.478*  -0.363  -0.361  -0.222  Processing exports outside economic zones 
as a Share of Total City Exports 
(0.533)  (0.533)  (0.523) (0.524) (0.266) (0.267) (0.261) (0.262) 
-36.93***    -37.60***  18.46***  18.80***   Student Enrollment in Institutions of 
Higher Education as a Share of the City 
Non-Agricultural Population  (11.40)    (11.35)   (5.70)  (5.67)  
 -1.04**    -1.15***    0.520**    0.575***  GMP per capita  
  (0.425)   (0.436)  (0.213)  (0.218) 
-0.443* -0.467**  -0.495**  -0.520**  0.222*  0.234**  0.248**  0.260**  Gross Metropolitan Product (GMP)  
(0.233)  (0.236)  (0.242) (0.243) (0.117) (0.118) (0.121) (0.122) 
   0.465 0.839      -0.233  -0.419  Foreign-invested firms’ share in city 
exports     (0.989) (1.018)      (0.494) (0.509) 
   1.91*** 1.95***      -0.953***  -0.976***  Joint venture firms’ share in city exports 
   (0.68)  (0.69)    (0.34)  (0.345) 
City Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects   Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Robust (clustered by city)  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  1981  1981  1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 
R-squared 0.98  0.98  0.98  0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   39
Appendix Table 8: What explains cross-city export structure, excluding city fixed 
effects? (log(EDI) as the dependent variable) 
Explanatory Variables  Yearly benchmark 2004  benchmark 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
-1.139*** -1.101*** -1.049*** -1.044*** -1.208*** -1.175*** -1.120*** -1.119***  Export Processing Zone Exports as a Share of 
Total City Exports 
(0.271) (0.261)  (0.26)  (0.256) (0.269) (0.253) (0.258) (0.247) 
-0.234*** -0.200*** -0.179*** -0.165*** -0.215*** -0.182*** -0.160*** -0.148***  Processing exports in High-tech Zones as a 
Share of Total City Exports 
(0.055) (0.059) (0.055) (0.059) (0.051) (0.055) (0.051) (0.054) 
-0.15  -0.198 -0.169 -0.216 -0.143 -0.192 -0.161 -0.209  Non-processing exports in High-tech Zones as a 
Share of Total City Exports 
(0.191) (0.185) (0.193) (0.186)  (0.17)  (0.168) (0.172) (0.169) 
-0.047*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.032*** -0.044*** -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.029***  Processing exports outside economic zones as a 
Share of Total City Exports 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.01)  (0.011)  (0.01) 
-0.741***  -0.787***  -0.733***  -0.779***   Student Enrollment in Institutions of Higher 
Education as a Share of the City Non-
Agricultural Population  (0.149)  (0.151)  (0.138)   (0.14)   
 -0.027***  -0.027***  -0.026***  -0.025***  GMP per capita  
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
-0.039*** -0.035*** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.034***  Gross Metropolitan Product (GMP)  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
   -0.066***  -0.043**     -0.064***  -0.043**  Foreign-invested firms’ share in city exports 
   (0.019)  (0.019)     (0.018)  (0.018) 
   0.007  0.015     0.006  0.013  Joint venture firms’ share in city exports 
   (0.011)  (0.01)     (0.01)  (0.01) 
City Fixed Effects  N N N N N N N N 
Year  Fixed  Effects    Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust  (clustered  by  city)  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 
R-squared  0.66 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.68 
 
Note: Standard errors given in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. 
 
 